From the time the JCPOA was signed to the first election of Mr. Trump, we in the commercial community suffered from the hesitancy of large financial institutions and global companies whereby, whilst deal structures were agreed to, their compliance departments held up the process for fear of the snapback mechanisms in the agreement – and all fears were Iran leaving, whilst it turned out that the USA did. Regardless, any new deal must mitigate the fear of snapback of any kind. If not, we will not have fully negotiated our economic value-added wants from the deal.
Steady and lasting investment in our country cannot be assumed to be the automatic byproduct of diplomacy. It is diplomacy that should ensure it. To this end, below is the best thinking on how to mitigate the risk of investment fear in Iran, should the geopolitical solution be felt by both sides after this upcoming first encounter.
These can be treated as a wish list of agreement principles. Suppose the US agrees to any combination of them. In that case, these can be legally spelled out in detailed clauses that accompany the lifting of economic sanctions in the framework of a final agreement. Below is the overview and the logical basis of each:
۱- Creation of Strategic Investment Guarantee Zones (SIGZ): legally designated, U.S. and Iran-approved zones (e.g., industrial parks, logistics hubs) that are insulated from future sanctions for 15 years. They are protected by both an executive order and Iranian legislation and can only be voided by a multilateral ruling. The logic: SIGZs create “sanctions-proof” corridors for long-cycle investment, enabling infrastructure, energy, and industrial capital to flow safely, regardless of broader geopolitical volatility.
۲- Bilateral Exit Compensation Mechanism (BECM): The IRI and US each fund a neutral escrow – from our side, a small percentage of our future oil revenues until an agreed amount is reached. If either party exits the deal unjustifiably, its share is used to compensate affected investors. A neutral arbitration panel determines the liability to be defined. The Escrow can be held in a mutually agreed neutral territory or body, again, to be defined. The logic: This “deterrence-by-design” reduces snapback fears by introducing real, enforceable penalties. It also signals to the private sector that political exits come with investor recourse.
۳- ۱۵-Year OFAC-Backed Grandfather Clause: OFAC issues pre-clearances on specific projects (especially in SIGZs), guaranteeing that risk mitigation of these investments remains legally valid for 15 years, regardless of future political reversals. The logic: Grandfathering gives regulatory certainty to institutional investors. It de-risks exposure to potential secondary sanctions, transforming political volatility into structured, manageable legal frameworks.
۴- Congressional Letter of Comfort + OFAC Fast-Track: The latter was most witnessed as a solution by US-based funds during the JCPOA. This is a non-binding but politically weighty Letter of Comfort from the US Congress that offers assurance that approved projects won’t be reversed arbitrarily. OFAC’s parallel fast-track approval mechanism ensures timely, low-friction compliance. That is, it bridges the time between the capital launch and the congressional letter of approval. The logic: This combination offers procedural clarity and risk mitigation signaling to international investors.
۵- U.S. Export Promotion Agency (EXIM)–Led Syndication Model: The U.S. Export-Import Bank (EXIM) commits to backing silent or explicit underwriting of financing for eligible U.S. firms investing in approved Iranian projects. When EXIM secures the final risk of a syndicated deal with U.S. commercial banks, its involvement will likely force harmonization across other export credit agencies (ECAs) such as Germany’s Hermes, France’s Bpifrance, or Italy’s SACE. The logic: If EXIM takes the lead, other ECAs follow the U.S. risk framework, enabling global syndication. Investors see strength in collective underwriting. This lowers capital costs, extends tenor, and creates sovereign-based backing for top-tier global private-sector finance in cross-border projects.
۶- EU Export Credit Anchoring Mechanism: In parallel, one EU member state (e.g., Germany or France) offers sovereign-backed credit guarantees. Once one ECA steps in, others (under OECD Arrangement rules) align behind it. This creates transatlantic coordination where political divergence is bypassed by commercial harmonization. Investors trust that once both U.S. and EU ECAs are engaged, snapback risk is institutionally offset.
Together, these six components form an ideal integrated architecture of legal, financial, and geo-economic insulation, giving top-tier global investors the immediate confidence they need to commit capital exposures with 7–۱۵-year horizons into our country.
Not all of these principles are needed to compel immediate investment flow into Iran – indeed, each one alone is likely to be highly effective.
However, if these demands are wrapped into a formal set of treaty principles, we would establish the strongest possible guarantee for long-term capital inflow into Iran. And now, remarkably, we have a historic opportunity to do just that: President Trump commands full Republican backing in the Senate, and the Democrats have consistently supported the idea of a nuclear deal. Ironically, it is Trump who now stands as perhaps the only American president in decades who could realistically deliver a two-thirds Senate majority to ratify a treaty, making it binding on future administrations. Strange that we are here, but perhaps this is the wrong that Trump can now make right.
Finally, on the operational side: as a prerequisite to any such deal, Iran must prepare its banking sector for the stress tests it will face. Our banks must urgently begin to review and strengthen their capital adequacy ratios to handle increased flows of trade, L/C issuance, and project finance. Financial preparedness must move in parallel with diplomatic success.
By the ACL Analysis Team