The Rome talks between the U.S. and Iran appear to have opened the door for a third, more technical round of negotiations in Muscat. The stakes are high—not just diplomatically, but in the precision and credibility of what is now “the last viable window” for re-establishing a long-term agreement.
As highlighted by recent technical briefs, any workable deal must respect the distinction between Iran’s civilian nuclear rights and the military red lines drawn by Washington and Tel Aviv. Enrichment for energy, medical, or research use is legally and technically permissible. What must be restricted—and verifiably so—is any capability for weaponization. The civilian-military distinction must become the backbone of any technical framework.
While some U.S. voices continue to demand the elimination of Iran’s entire nuclear infrastructure, this stance lacks precedent or technical feasibility. The knowledge cannot be undone; dismantling the physical network would be symbolic at best and provocation at worst. Iran’s Supreme Leader’s refusal to permit program elimination stems from rational technical and strategic concerns, chief among them, preserving energy independence and hedging against repeat U.S. withdrawals.
Instead of chasing the illusion of zero enrichment, negotiators must focus on three core principles: verifiability, specificity, and phased benefit. Iran is more likely to accept ceilings (e.g., 3.67% enrichment, centrifuge limitations, capped stockpile sizes) with a robust IAEA verification layer than to yield to blanket disarmament demands.
From the Western side, a technically viable economic incentive package is essential. Precision, not promises, is what will unlock Iranian engagement. Each verified stage must be tied to a defined tranche of economic relief, frozen asset access, and safe banking protocols.
To support this, a detailed global survey of compliance officers should be urgently conducted to identify the structural fears within major financial institutions regarding exposure to Iran. Such a survey would help illuminate the major operational and legal risk points, including:
- FATF non-compliance continues to pose reputational and procedural hurdles. A clear Iranian roadmap to re-engage with FATF standards will be critical.
- SWIFT reintegration for designated Iranian financial institutions, viewed as a hard operational precondition by many global banks.
- USD U-turn restrictions, which block even indirect transaction flows through the U.S. system, exploring exemptions or the development of non-USD trade infrastructure would be central to any long-term engagement.
Examples of mitigation tools that could be tested and refined through such a survey include:
- Strategic Investment Guarantee Zones (SIGZs) under OFAC and EU endorsement.
- Jointly Seeded Tiered Risk Participation Fund (TRPF) backed only by agreement signatories.
- Independent Arbitration Panels with jurisdiction recognized by all parties.
- Dual Escrow Accounts offering project-level control.
- Parallel U.S./EU Compliance Monitoring to replace unilateral ambiguity.
- IMF/Third-Party Monitoring of Funds to ensure integrity.
- Snapback Protection Clauses shield pre-committed capital.
- Sector-Limited Engagement to minimize reputational and policy risk.
- Technical specificity in defining acceptable enrichment and verification milestones.
- Infrastructure clarity on FATF, SWIFT, and payment channels.
These instruments are not yet tested at scale, but they provide a concrete basis for discussion. It is now up to negotiators and stakeholders to validate, refine, and adopt what is legally and politically feasible. The time for conceptual debate is over.
In Muscat, it’s not diplomacy on the nuclear file alone that will save the day—it’s clarity on meaningful, early, and viable benefits to the Iranian economy. Without removing the persistent fear of sudden reversals, there can be no lasting trust and no lasting deal. That is the key detail.
By the ACL Analysis Team